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Tuesday, December 19, 2017 Courtroom 1A Baltimore, Maryland
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            IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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            IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
                        NORTHERN DIVISION
                        NORTHERN DIVISION
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
        vs. ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CCB-17-106
        vs. ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CCB-17-106
    WAYNE PART JPNTKINS
    WAYNE PART JPNTKINS
    EARL JENKINS,
    EARL JENKINS,
    DANIEL THOMAS HERSL, ) MOTIONS HEARING
    DANIEL THOMAS HERSL, ) MOTIONS HEARING
    and )
    and )
    MARCUS ROOSEVELT TAYLOR, )
    MARCUS ROOSEVELT TAYLOR, )
        Defendants.
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        Defendants.
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## BEFORE: THE HONORABLE CATHERINE C. BLAKE, JUDGE

For the Plaintiff:
Leo Wise, Esquire
Derek Hines, Esquire
Assistant United States Attorneys
For the Defendant, Daniel Hersl:
William Purpura, Esquire
For the Defendant, Wayne Jenkins:
Steven Levin, Esquire
For the Defendant, Marcus Taylor:
Jenifer Wicks, Esquire
Also Present:
John Siracki, Task Force Operator Thomas Rafter, Esquire

## Reported by:

Nadine M. Gazic, RMR, CRR
Federal Official Court Reporter 101 W. Lombard Street, 4th Floor Baltimore, Maryland 21201

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410-962-4753
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## PROCEEDINGS

(2:38 p.m.)
THE COURT: Would you like to call the case?
MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor. The case is
United States of America versus Jenkins, Hersl and Taylor.
Criminal Number CCB-17-106. Assistant United States Attorney Leo Wise and Derek Hines and with us at counsel table is task force officer John Siracki and we're here this afternoon for a motions hearing.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.
MR. PURPURA: Judge Blake, good afternoon. William Purpura. I'm joined at trial table with Thomas Rafter. Mr. Rafter is a member of this Bar and he hopes to be a member of the CJA panel and he's looking for some experience, so he's second chair to me in this trial. We're here to represent Daniel Hersl.

THE COURT: All right, glad to have both of you, and Mr. Hersl.

MR. LEVIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Steven Levin on behalf of Wayne Jenkins who is standing to my right.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.
MS. WICKS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jenifer Wicks on behalf of Mr. Taylor who is standing to my right.

THE COURT: Glad to have all of you. You may be seated, please.

THE COURT: All right.
THE CLERK: Please remain standing and raise your right hand.
(Witness sworn.)
THE CLERK: Thank you, you may be seated. Please speak clearly into the microphone. Please state your name and spell your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Matthew J. Vilcek. V-i-l-c-e-k.
THE CLERK: Thank you.
D I R E CT
EXAMINATION

BY MR. HINES:
Q. Mr. Vilcek, where do you work?
A. I'm a special agent with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.
Q. How long have you been with the FBI?
A. I just passed 18 years.
Q. And what kinds of cases do you predominantly work now?
A. I worked a number of different cases in the Baltimore division, including public corruption. Most of my time has been spent working in violent crimes against children matters.

MR. HINES: Sorry, Your Honor, just having some technical difficulties.

## BY MR. HINES:

Q. Special Agent Vilcek, did you participate or assist in the interviews of Baltimore Police Department officers on March 1, 2017?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was your role on that day?
A. I was one of the agents selected to be an interviewer and I interviewed Marcus Taylor on that date.
Q. And can you describe or summarize your interactions with Mr. Taylor before the interview began officially?
A. The arrest operation occurred prior to my involvement. I believe a tactical team had taken custody of Mr. Taylor and he was ushered into a room within the Internal Affairs Bureau at the Baltimore City Police Department. He had been placed into a separate room pending availability of an interview room that was properly outfitted with video recording equipment.

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Vilcek - direct
Motions Hearing
Q. Did you engage in any substantive conversations with Detective Taylor prior to him being placed in an interview room?
A. Nothing substantive. It was communicated to me that he was experiencing slight health issues, that he had been examined --

MS. WICKS: Objection, nonresponsive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. And we had just made sure that he was feeling well. We had communicated to him that we could take him to the restroom, we could provide him with water if he needed it. And I believe we did both of those things during that time and explained to him that we were just waiting for a room to become available.
Q. And why was the Internal Affairs Office used to interview Detective Taylor and other folks on this day?
A. It was a tactic. It was a place where police officers routinely respond for training or for inquiries. They were required to remove their firearm upon entering the building. It was a matter of safety, so $I$ believe this is why that place was selected.
Q. And I'm showing you what's been marked as Government's Exhibit 1. Do you recognize Government's Exhibit 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is Government's Exhibit 1?
A. It's a document that contains the criminal case number, indicates the pretrial motions and contains a description of each of the items listed as exhibits.
Q. Flip to the next tab, that's actually --
A. Oh, number one -- this is a transcript of the audio recording involving Mr. Taylor.
Q. Okay. And have you reviewed that transcript of the audio recording?
A. I have, up to minute 9:40, I believe.
Q. And is that transcript a fair and accurate summary of the first approximately nine minutes of the interview of Mr. Taylor?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you make any threats to Mr. Taylor during those first nine minutes?
A. Not at all.
Q. Did the interview continue after those nine minutes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were any threats made against Mr. Taylor to induce his statements?
A. No.
Q. During those first nine minutes did you read Mr. Taylor his Miranda rights?
A. I did.
Q. And can you find on there where you read him his Miranda
rights on the transcription?
A. It's in the vicinity -- the counter number reading is 6 minutes and 46 seconds. It followed the reading showing Mr. Taylor the charges against him, the charging document and then we went on to read him the Miranda form.
Q. And can you read -- starting with the bold -- before we ask you any questions, what you said?
A. Before we ask you any questions you must understand your rights. The matter under investigation is criminal in nature and constitutes one or more violations of law. You are not being compelled to provide information regarding your official duties pursuant to an agency disciplinary investigation or proceeding by your employer. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer present with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish and if you decide to answer any questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. The consent form portion of the form that reads --

That I've read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are and at this time I'm willing to answer questions without a lawyer present. So if you're willing to do that, you want to speak with us, initial each line up here that you understand and we'll make this possible for you and then you can just sign. So if you could just -- and start initial here and then just each line down below.
Q. And does Mr. Taylor acknowledge his Miranda rights?
A. He does.
Q. Does he waive his Miranda rights?
A. He did. He initialed each line of the form and then signed it.
Q. And you can turn to Exhibit 2? Do you recognize Exhibit $2 ?$
A. I do.
Q. What is Exhibit 2?
A. It's the warning and advice of rights to provide information on a voluntary basis.
Q. And are those in the left hand column, what are those initials?
A. Those are Mr. Taylor's initials.
Q. And where it says "signed," whose signature is that?
A. Marcus Taylor.
Q. And you witnessed him sign this consent form?
A. I did.

MR. HINES: Your Honor, no further questions on direct.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.
MS. WICKS: May I, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Ms. Wicks? Of course.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

## BY MS. WICKS:

Q. Good afternoon, Agent.
A. Good afternoon, ma'am.
Q. So your first dealing with Mr. Taylor was on March 1st of this year?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And as part of this tactic that the team was using, someone from Baltimore City Police Department contacted Mr. Taylor the day before, correct?
A. It's my understanding, yes.
Q. Okay. It's your understanding. You weren't present for that conversation, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You were told what occurred during that conversation?
A. We were advised that they would be arriving on that date for what they thought was a meeting at Internal Affairs.
Q. Okay. So you were not told what occurred during that conversation, correct?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And were you made aware that Mr. Taylor asked if he needed a lawyer for that interview?
A. Can you repeat the question?
Q. Were you made aware that Mr. Taylor during that phone conversation asked if he needed a lawyer for the interview that was being conducted at the Internal Affairs Office on March 1st?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware why he was told to respond to that location?
A. It was our understanding that -- and $I$ had been involved in operations like this in the past --
Q. Well, I'm not asking you about the past. I'm asking about this particular day.
A. That he was being brought there under some sort of rouse to have some sort of meeting at Internal Affairs and that he was going to be arrested on that day.
Q. Okay. And you testified that this tactic was being used because it's your understanding that the IA office was a place where Baltimore police officers would respond for training and inquiries, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so that was information that you were told by the

Baltimore Police Department about why officers would respond to that building, correct?
A. This is what $I$ know operationally from past experience as well as in dealings with this case.
Q. Okay. So from your past experience you know that training occurs in that building?
A. It is my understanding that it could be training, it could be for an inquiry, it could be for a number of reasons. Really why they were going there was not of my interest, just the fact that they were going to be there and what my role was.
Q. Okay. And so since that wasn't your interest, you didn't inquire as to what he was told in the telephone conversation, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And now you -- Court's indulgence. Actually, if the Government has number one? Do you have number one up there, sir?
A. I do, ma'am.
Q. Okay. In the transcript that we just looked at on page 1 actually, the third line that is you speaking, there's a long paragraph -- then apparently Mr. Taylor interrupts you -- then you finish your paragraph so-to-speak, he agrees that you all hadn't had conversations specifically about the case and you indicated, we've talked about procedural things, right?
A. Correct.
Q. That's what you said that day, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so when you testified today about substance, you did talk to him about his condition on that day, correct?

THE COURT: I'm confused by the question.
MS. WICKS: I'm sorry. I'll just start over.
BY MS. WICKS:
Q. Before the recorder is turned on, outside of the room did you have conversations with him?
A. Yes.
Q. Or was it someone else that had conversations with him about his condition that day?
A. Both.
Q. Okay. And when other people had conversations with him about his condition that day, were you present when Mr. Taylor was responding?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Okay. So again, this is information -- there's
apparently part of this information that you were present for but there's part of this information that you learned from other people, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And that morning, Mr. Taylor was having a hard time dealing with what was going on, correct?

| A. I don't know if $I$ could describe it as a hard time. What |
| :--- |
| was communicated to me was that he was having some sort of | was communicated to me was that he was having some sort of medical issue, $I$ believe somewhat similar to an asthmatic reaction, that he was treated and that when $I$ had arrived, that the matter had been resolved.

Q. Okay. So he received medical attention that morning at that Internal Affairs Office, correct?
A. What $I$ was told, yes.
Q. What you were told. And you were told that he was cleared by medical staff, correct?
A. That there was no longer an issue, correct.
Q. Because you wouldn't have interviewed him if there had been an issue, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And based on the information that you received from other people and what you observed, you then proceeded to speak with him and then eventually at about 6 minutes your testimony -there's I'll agree some of this is people leaving the room -but at about a little over 6 minutes you read him his rights, correct?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And when you were interviewing him, were there other -were there other -- other than Mr. Taylor, were there other people that worked for the Baltimore Police Department present either in the room or watching what was occurring? they maybe were, but as far as in the room with me there was one other special agent and Mr. Taylor.
Q. Okay. And you also testified that the procedure when officers come to that building is that there's a place where they put up their guns, correct?
A. That was my understanding, yes.
Q. Okay. And did you learn from any source that day that Mr. Taylor had left his gun in the car?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Okay. Did you receive information that he was unarmed by the time he got into the room with you?
A. That was the pre-planning in our communications for the operation prior to that event happening, that was the plan for that to happen. Our SWAT team was involved with the arrest of these individuals. I spent ten years on the SWAT team, so I had a fair understanding that he would be unarmed when we showed up, yes.
Q. Okay, but part of the planning here is you didn't know what was said to him the day before and what he said, correct? A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And -- Court's indulgence. Now, when the -- there were IA officers that were aware at least the day before that Mr. Taylor and other officers were being asked to come to that building on March 1st, correct? Q. Okay. Well there was a certain -- because of the circumstances of this investigation, there was limited information that Baltimore police -- Baltimore Police Department had about what was happening on March 1st, correct? A. That would be logical, yes.
Q. Okay. And that's what happened on March 1st, correct, and the dates coming up to March 1st?
A. Regarding who knew what at that time, I'm not privy to that information. All $I$ know is that typically in these types of investigations, obviously due to the sensitivity, information is kept close hold, both by the FBI and the Baltimore City Police Department.
Q. So do you know -- the person that contacted Mr. Taylor to tell him to come to the office on March 1st, was that person aware that Mr. Taylor was getting arrested?
A. I don't know.
Q. Or was he part of the -- was he being tricked as well?
A. I don't know who called him on that day.
Q. Was that part of the plan for the day?
A. It was our understanding that they were to respond to that facility for some purpose.
Q. Okay. And you don't know if the person that contacted him to tell him to come, if that person was aware or not that Mr. Taylor was actually being arrested when he came there,
correct?
A. I don't know who the person is, no, ma'am.
Q. Okay, thank you. No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Any further questions, Mr. Hines?

MR. HINES: No, Your Honor. We offer the transcript as a timesaving device. We also have the video of approximately three hours if it's of any interest to the Court, however otherwise we'll rest.

THE COURT: I think Government Exhibit 1, the transcript and 2, the warning of advice of rights are sufficient for this.

Okay, thank you. You can step down. Ms. Wicks, do you plan on calling any witnesses or presenting any evidence on this motion?

MS. WICKS: No, Your Honor. We are not calling any witnesses or presenting evidence and I'd submit.

THE COURT: And you'll submit on your papers?

MS. WICKS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything you want to say, Mr.
Hines?

MR. HINES: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right, somebody else want to say anything? No? Okay.

Okay, well this is a Motion to Suppress statements and I appreciate that it is a motion that needs to be brought
and be heard in advance of the trial, but the record in front of me now shows absolutely no reason to suppress the statement made by Mr. Taylor on March 1, 2017. It appears that he was properly advised of his Miranda rights, understood them, acknowledged them.

It appears that whatever medical condition he may have been suffering from, breathing or asthma, something of that nature, had been resolved. He was offered a restroom, a drink of water, all those sorts of things. There's no evidence of any threat or promise being made to him, so there's no coercion. There's no overbearing of his will. So the statement is voluntary in a constitutional sense as well as being taken in compliance with Miranda, so $I$ will be denying that motion.

Okay, Ms. Wicks, do you want to be -- there are a number of motions that you filed on behalf of Mr. Taylor additionally. Would you like to be heard on those?

MS. WICKS: Your Honor, I think one, for example, 208 I didn't quite understand the Government's response, but the purpose of that is clearly not to waste the Court's time. I know other counsel filed similar motions.

THE COURT: Well, let me -- let me get them -- let's just maybe just go down the list and then $I$ won't miss any. I've got a motion for bill of particulars.

MS. WICKS: I'm submitting on that one.

THE COURT: All right, number 205. And on that I will deny. It appears to me that there is sufficient detail in the superseding indictment when combined with the discovery to make a bill of particulars not required in this instance.

Let's see, the Motion to Dismiss counts 1, 2, 3 and 4, that is based on the -- you've challenged to the RICO statute?

MS. WICKS: Well, so I'm submitting on Counts 1 and 2. 3 and 4 really deal with Hersl's motions and I know Mr. Purpura has argument, so I am asking to join those and those deal with my Counts 3 and 4.

THE COURT: Okay, all right. I understand that then, thank you. I'll deny it as to Counts 1 and 2 . I don't think there's any infirmities in the RICO statute itself. We'll defer and I'll understand that you're adopting the argument on behalf of Mr. Hersl as far as Counts 3 and 4. We'll get to that.

Then there was a Motion to Exclude evidence intrinsic to the charged criminal acts but not charged in the indictment. I will tell you how $I$ understood that and you can correct me if I'm wrong. It's essentially a 404(b), but you're anticipating the possibility that something you might think of as $404(\mathrm{~b})$ would be labeled intrinsic and therefore admissible by the Government and you want to head that off.

MS . WICKS: I do.
THE COURT: Okay. So I understand because there's
also essentially a 404(b) motion I believe on behalf of Mr. Hersl which would be -- that's document number 226. Your is 207. My understanding is the Government's response there is that it's premature, that if there is going to be $404(\mathrm{~b})$ evidence it would be contained in the Jencks which is not due to be turned over until two weeks before trial.

MR. WISE: Your Honor, so our position is that there will be additional information in the Jencks as one would expect. Whether one characterizes that as $404(b)$ or intrinsic, it's just there's simply going to be more and that's what's been agreed to by the parties that that would be produced two weeks before trial. So we think it's not ripe.

THE COURT: But other than what may be contained in the Jencks which is going to be provided two weeks before trial, you are not sitting there thinking to yourself that you have additional 404(b) evidence that you're just not disclosing yet?

MR. WISE: That's right, exactly.
THE COURT: All right, it will be in the Jencks. So we can argue about it if we need to when we see what's in the Jencks. All right, so we'll defer on 404(b) issues.

MR. PURPURA: Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PURPURA: Respectfully on the 404 (b) issue, obviously there's a discovery agreement which has been signed
in this case, but this case in particular as to Mr. Hersl there was an original indictment, now a superseding indictment. Some of the overt acts, some of the charged substantive acts have changed. And it's really a due process consideration at this point. We have to be prepared for trial so we're asking as $404(\mathrm{~b})$ says, reasonable notice. And I certainly think that now three weeks out or three-and-a-half weeks out with Christmas and New Years coming up is reasonable notice. There's no reason, good reason for the Government to hold back whether they think it's intrinsic or whether it's $404(\mathrm{~b})$, these particular acts to identify them so we can be prepared.

This is going to be multiple trials in one trial, at least six or seven different thefts and who knows what else there may be in this case. So it's multiple acts and it's very difficult to be prepared unless we have some notice. And it's just a basic due process consideration, reasonableness, three weeks out, holidays coming up. It's reasonable today. There's no threat to security. There's no threat to witnesses. That's what we're asking for, thank you.

MR. WISE: We would disagree with the last statement, Your Honor. Witnesses are very fearful in this case of the fact that they will be testifying against police officers. Almost to a person the witnesses have said that. And so we agreed on a Jencks deadline, agreed on it. That's
what the arrangement we came to that's two weeks in advance and that will be the Jencks, both grand jury material and 302 s will be the vehicle that additional information will be provided in. And I'm always reluctant to characterize because it is inevitably used against me later, you know, something that defense counsel might characterize as $404(\mathrm{~b})$ we would not necessarily agree with something that we think is squarely within the four corners of the indictment, they may say is not, but the place where -- the vehicle that comes in is in the Jencks material and then if there are issues as Your Honor has said that need to be addressed through motions in limine or something, the schedule contemplates that.

MR. PURPURA: Your Honor, so I can be abundantly clear, I'm not asking for early Jencks. What I'm asking for are dates of incidents and claimed incidents. That's it. So give me a date in 2015 or way back in 2014 or 2016 as to what particular incident. I don't need anything more than that, but we have to have some sort of notice to be prepared. And that's not unreasonable in this case.

MR. WISE: I think the issue is, Your Honor, that there are certain information that once disclosed will make it clear who was talking to us and what they are talking about. And so that's why we've produced Rule 16 discovery in the form of incident reports and statements of probable cause and property receipts and evidence like that, but we will produce
testimonial evidence on the Jencks schedule.
If the purpose of all this is notice, I think there's been abundant notice. It was a detailed original indictment, a detailed superseding indictment with specific names, with specific dates. And the purpose of an indictment is simply to put the defendant on notice. So that we think has happened in spades here. We even have used initials of people. We didn't say "victim one," so these are all people that the defendants interacted with. We even gave them initials so there's no -there's really no surprise here and they can track those initials back to the incident reports and the statements of probable cause. And we did all that deliberately so that we could give them maximum information and notice while at the same time, respecting the concerns that the witnesses have.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PURPURA: Judge Blake, I don't want to keep on jumping up and down like a Jack in the Box, but as in my 404(b) motion I stated and as I mentioned to the Court earlier, the Government has changed and at least it appears --

THE COURT: --to your benefit.
MR. PURPURA: Well, I'm not sure. If they're not going to use those acts they alleged in the first indictment that's fine. But what happens now two weeks out of trial to say now I get notice that, you know those acts we had in there before, some of the substantive acts and some of the overt
acts, we find those to be intrinsic even though we didn't charge them. We're going to use them. And I'm saying that's kind of late notice for that and that's all.

THE COURT: Whatever that was, you're on notice of it because you knew it was there to begin with and now it's out.

I'm going to -- I will repeat my ruling, I am deferring on the $404(\mathrm{~b})$. I think you have an agreement for two weeks of Jencks. I think there are valid witness concerns. That will not certainly preclude you, Mr. Purpura or anyone else from letting me know if there is something in the Jencks production that is so unexpected and therefore prejudicial and hard for you to meet in advance. I expect $I$ will hear from you at that point if that sort of situation arises.

MR. PURPURA: Thank you, you will.
THE COURT: All right. Let's see. Continuing or going now to the other pretrial motions filed on behalf of Mr. Hersl, there is a motion to dismiss Count 5 as duplicitous, that was ECF number 203. Do you want to be heard on that?

MR. PURPURA: I do, Your Honor. And just prior to that, $I$ would as I did file a motion to join just for the record, I am joining Ms. Wicks or Mr. Taylor's motion as to the RICO statute.

THE COURT: Sure, okay, yes, I'm sorry. You did, number 202 is your motion to adopt and that also 208 was Ms.

Wicks's motion to adopt on behalf of her client.
So, to the extent applicable to the other defendants, that's fine.

MR. PURPURA: Your Honor, if I may, obviously you've received our writings on this and I've reviewed the Government's writing, their response and basically $I$ think probably the simple stupid formula works on this particular count, duplicitous indictment charges more than one offense in a single count.

I read the Government's response and respectfully, I think that misses the point completely. The Government in their response seizes upon the robbery element of 1951 . The cases they cite in support of that all deal with the attack pretrial on the robbery by threat of force and violence portion of 1951 , that the language would be duplicitous in that particular portion of the robbery through threat or violence. It does not, it does not address the other two separate crimes in 1951 which is extortion by force and/or extortion by color of law.

And they do cite, the one case they do cite is the Morgan case. The Morgan case comes out of the Eastern District of Michigan. And just to show my point, I did obtain the indictment which I've marked as Defense Exhibit 1 at this point of the Morgan case and I'll put it on the overhead. Now again, this is a 1951 robbery indictment. And strangely
enough, you're going to see it's identical to the way that we file 1951 Hobbs Act robbery by force or threat of force in this district as well as probably every other district in the United States.

The important part comes right here where it says, Mr. Morgan did unlawfully take cash and store merchandise from the presence of a store employee and against her will by means of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury.

Now, all that the case in Morgan was that the lawyers pretrial was suggesting that this is duplicitous because there's multiple ways to achieve the force. And under Johnson therefore they're attacking it. That's not what we're doing in this case, completely. We are completely satisfied that that robbery by force or threat of force in itself is not duplicitous.

And it goes on to say that Otis Lee Morgan, junior robbed the employee at gunpoint. So clearly the defendant is on notice that it's a robbery through force and threat of force. Clearly the grand jury had -- at least a majority of the grand jurors found that in this particular case there's probable cause for a robbery through force or threat of force.

Our indictments in this district are the same for Hobbs Act robbery by force or threat of force. This is Defense Exhibit number 2 coming from a recent case before Judge Bennett where it says, the defendants -- and I'll get down to
the important part -- the defendants did unlawfully take and obtain money and property from the person and presence of an employee at the Liberty Gas Station at the employee's will by means of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury, immediate and future, to the employee by threatening serious physical injury and death to said employee.

Clearly we know what the grand jury decided. Clearly we know what the elements are and what crime the defendant is going to defend against in this particular case, in that case.

Now, what we have here for the first time that I've seen and the Court can set me straight, would be our count 5. And our Count 5 sets out three separate and distinct crimes. Archive 5 cites the entire 1951 statute. It says that approximately $\$ 20,000$ against such -- was taken against such person's will by means of actual and threatened force of violence and fear of injury, immediate and future.

So we have the first crime, that's the taking through force and threat of force. And then we have the second crime which is the extortion by force. And it goes on to say, and with their consent induced by wrongful use of actual and threatened force -- that's the second crime completely different elements than the first crime in 1951. And then the third substantive crime is under color of official right. So you have literally, 1951, does have three separate and distinct crimes with separate and distinct elements in the
crimes.
And if that's not sufficient, in the Government's own response on page 19 to a different issue, they put down on page 19, they give you the sand and Siffert jury instruction. And lo and behold, Sand and Siffert have three separate jury instructions for the 1951 Hobbs Act robbery because there are three distinct crimes with three distinct elements in the 1951.

So, what I'm saying respectfully is that based on what $I$ consider the muddled and confusing indictment submitted to the grand jury, we are -- first, the defendant has a Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury, to have his probable cause before a grand jury on this type of case. So we know the Fifth Amendment. As much as the grand jury has been watered down, this would be to completely dilute any purpose of a grand jury, because we have absolutely no basis to have any confidence whatsoever when an improper, duplicitous indictment is submitted to a grand jury that sufficient numbers of grand jurors could have found validity in any one of the three separate and distinct crimes charged in 1951, whether it was by force, whether it was by consent or whether it was by consent through official act. That's the Fifth Amendment.

The defendant himself now three weeks from trial has a Fourth Amendment due process right to be informed of the Government's theory of this case. So a Fourth Amendment is
implicated. We do not know whether their theory is a robbery by force or threat of force, an extortion by force or threat of force and/or by color of officers, since he was a police officer when these thefts took place.

So, I'm asking the Court and I think the Court, this is just abundantly clear that this is a classic duplicitous indictment. We know from the cases the Government cited, that the Morgan case they cited what the indictment said and that wasn't duplicitous. They just misread the argument. We know from the indictments that we present here in Hobbs Act robbery how Hobbs Act robberies are charged either an extortion and/or a robbery itself and we know from Sand and Siffert that there's three separate instructions because there's three separate crimes and you don't want to confuse them as one.

So, for those reasons I'm asking the court to dismiss Count 5. It should be dismissed. Now the remedy would be the Government could possibly re-file, perhaps, perhaps not since we have a short time before trial, but that would be a remedy because I'm not sure the court can deal with prejudice at this point, but since the trial is so close the court could, with prejudice, grant the dismissal.

It has an effect as well on count 6 , which is the handgun violation. Because here as the Government almost, almost consents to but not quite there, they consent that if it is Hobbs Act robbery under the color of law, that perhaps that's
not a crime of violence.
THE COURT: That's not even one of the robbery, that's not even a robbery charge at that point, that's the extortion with consent under official right.

MR. PURPURA: Right, so we don't know and then count 6 would go as well. So that's where we are. Maybe I'm just misreading things, but it seems like $I$ said, simple stupid where we are on this particular count. And I have tried to rectify with some -- $I$ haven't hidden my defense in this case. This is where I am, where are you? Here's the facts. Tell me what you have. But that's also for another motion. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you. Before I turn to the Government, does anybody else want to be heard in -- I know people are joining in to the extent it applies to them. Any additional argument?

MR. LEVIN: No, thank you, Your Honor. I think Mr. Purpura articulated it beautifully.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. WICKS: No, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Wise?
MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor. The defendant's Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment argument as he characterizes it ignores the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamling and Costello that a valid -- an indictment that is
valid on its face is sufficient to proceed to trial. The argument that there's some due process or Fifth Amendment issue to enable a defendant to look behind the indictment and invade the deliberations of the grand jury is simply not supported and in fact they offer no authority for that proposition. And the Supreme Court has said just the opposite.

Again, in Costello, the Supreme Court said an indictment constituted by a legal and unbiased grand jury if valid on its face is enough to call for the trial on the merits. And in Hamling the Court said, it defined that phrase valid on its face as it is generally sufficient that indictments set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.

Now, Mr. Purpura calls the indictment muddled, but the indictment word for word tracks the language of the statute that the Congress passed. And that is certainly sufficient to put Mr. Hersl on notice as to the charges against him.

The Fourth Circuit has said and again, this is a common -- this is a common phenomenon in cases that involve statutes like this that it is settled that a charging document must allege conjunctively the disjunctive components of an underlying statute. And that's what the Congress did with the Hobbs Act. It provided three alternative --

THE COURT: Let me just ask you, Mr. Wise, I mean, that would be true generally in any Hobbs Act robbery that we
normally see. That is not normally how indictments are brought. I mean, I'm not sure that it's a requirement. If it were a requirement that every one of the three ways of violating the Hobbs Act were it had to be included in the indictment there would have been a lot of dismissed indictments by now in this district. I don't think it has to be .

MR. WISE: It's not a requirement, but where there are facts that a jury could find satisfied any one of the three variants -- we'll use that word -- then it is appropriate to charge it in the way that it has been charged. Obviously the difference between Hobbs Act robbery and extortion is principally one of consent. And the difference between extortion, violent extortion and extortion under color of official right is violence.

There will be facts presented to a jury that a jury could conclude and we'll submit a special verdict on this as we've said, that violence was applied and Hobbs Act robbery was made out. That violence was applied, but there was consent given and again, these are police officers. And so these are factual issues that a jury will have to decide that when a police officer shows up to execute a search warrant, when a police officer pulls you over, violence is present, but there is also in a number of these instances, an element that potentially a jury could find is consent, that the victim
didn't put up enough of a fight and so that even though they may have run or they were -- they put up some degree of what would be normally understood as resisting, they ultimately consented.

And then there are other instances where they may find that there was consent simply because of the presentation of official right. The presentation of authority. And those are all factual issues that will be really for the jury to decide and they'll get a unanimity instruction and we'll even submit a special verdict so it's clear as to these Hobbs Act counts what they have concluded. But we think the facts of this case warrant presenting those three versions that the Congress drafted of the statute.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PURPURA: Your Honor, briefly again, I believe again the Government is missing the point. The indictment here, count 5 of the indictment on its face is invalid. The Court cannot retroactively give a jury verdict form which is going to cure an indictment on its face which we have absolutely no confidence in that the grand jurors could have agreed to these mutually inconsistent offenses. The elements are completely inconsistent in the three.

The proper way this indictment should have been presented to the grand jury in order to have any Fifth Amendment validity in a grand jury proceeding would have been if the

Government believes they can show these three things, present it, three separate counts to the grand jury. One for robbery through force or threat of force, one through extortion, force or threat of force, and one as far as through official acts in a public position. They didn't do that. They submitted and again, in what $I$ term to be a muddled indictment and we can have absolutely no confidence. So if you don't have a valid indictment, then you just don't have it.

THE COURT: How would having it in three separate counts be better or more fair to the client? I mean, wouldn't I be looking at some sort of multiplicitas objection?

MR. PURPURA: If we're going right back to what the grand jury was presented with, that's what I'm suggesting, that the grand jury is presented with a single count which has three separate crimes. The defendant has an absolute right to know which crimes the grand jury had a conclusion of probable cause on. He does not know that from this indictment based on the way the three separate crimes are charged in one single count. What I believe is that quite frankly, when this was submitted to the grand jury before anyone pled or anything else, the Government really didn't know what they had. They didn't know if it was a Hobbs Act robbery by force or threat of force. They didn't know if it was an extortion. They didn't know exactly what they had, so they just submitted the whole thing to the grand jury. You just can't have any confidence.

THE COURT: What case are you relying on for my going back in to how the grand jury might have voted or what they found probable cause on?

MR. PURPURA: That you can only if it's valid on its face and on the face of this indictment, this count, it cannot be valid because you have three separate and distinct crimes charged. There are multiple statutes we have. And if you look at the sex statutes which charge multiple ways that a particular statute can be violated and they're all separate and distinct because they're separate crimes. And all the indictments in those they just don't charge a statute as take your pick, it's broken down as to what it is.

THE COURT: And which of the cases that you cite, what do you think is close to supporting your argument on this?

MR. PURPURA: Quite frankly, I haven't really found anything on this particular -- I have not seen this statute cited in that way before. The cases that I gave to the court for the Fourth Circuit, what is duplicitous. So if this is not duplicitous, $I$ don't know what is. Fourth Circuit says if it's duplicitous on its face it's not a valid indictment. It's not a valid count.

And I can, the one case I did cite -- and that's in paragraph 3 and that is a United States v. Burns 990 F. $2 d 1426$
at 1438 Fourth Circuit. Duplicitous indictment charges more than one offense in a single count. So obviously we recognize that counts can be duplicitous and clearly that any reading of this count shows that it is duplicitous.

THE COURT: Would you -- are you saying you would agree on behalf of your client that if the indictment charged three separate offenses occurring on July 8, 2016 against your client, both Hobbs Act -- well all three, Hobbs Act robbery in one count, extortion in the second count and extortion by consent in the third count that would be okay?

MR. PURPURA: I'm not sure. I don't believe so. Again, $I$ go back to -- the Government who brings this case, you bring the case, you're going to present a case to a grand jury, you know what the defendant did when you bring that case to the grand jury. That's their responsibility. It's not just to throw a hodgepodge out there. Can you image what the instructions were in this case to the grand jury? I can't because we know under color of law they can't get a 924 (c) and they got it in the sixth count. Did they tell them that was also a crime of violence? So that's -- that's my argument.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Anything else on this motion?

MR. WISE: No, Your Honor, thank you.
THE COURT: I'm going to defer ruling on that for now.

MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, just to be clear we have adopted that motion.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LEVIN: And that argument would be relevant to Counts 3, 4, 5 and 6 for us.

THE COURT: For your client, yes. Okay. I know this is related, but not identical, the next one is number 203, motion to dismiss Count 6 for failure to state a claim.

MR. PURPURA: Your Honor, I'll make that easy.

We'll submit on that. We'll preserve it, we'll submit upon that.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PURPURA: You did hear my argument how it does tie back into Count 5, so that is an issue but aside from that we'll just submit. Count 6 , correct.

THE COURT: Right, my understanding on Count 6 is part of what the Government is saying there, assuming for the moment that Count 5 is not duplicitous, is not invalid on its face, that what we really have is a post trial motion rather than a pretrial motion. I think Judge Ellis down in the Eastern District went that way and that seemed to me to be where $I$ would be going as far as Count 6 and Count 4.

MR. PURPURA: I'm not disagreeing with that. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anybody else want to be
heard to the extent that the motion to dismiss count 6 which would also apply to $I$ believe Count 4, the $924(c)$ claims? Does anybody want to be heard differently on that?

MR. LEVIN: No, thank you.
MS. WICKS: No, I'd submit on that as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, all right. Thank you then $I$ think we'll -- I'm deferring on the motion about Count 5 and 3 being duplicitous, but Counts 4 and 6 will survive for post trial motions if those counts in the indictment are not dismissed.

Motion for release of Brady materials. Your number 224 , Mr. Purpura?

MR. PURPURA: Judge, you know, I'll tell you this is the first time I filed a Brady motion since I've been practicing in federal court over 30 years. I think they're extraordinary motions normally. Normally we receive all the information that we believe we're entitled to, especially in this particular district, but in this case I don't think that I have. Because I don't believe the Government understands, I don't believe the Government agrees with the legality of the defense which $I$ proposed from the beginning of this particular case.

I can tell the Court as I mentioned earlier, I've given the Government in numerous e-mails and discussions the theory of the case as the way I see it, that Detective Hersl while on
the gun task force and prior to being on that particular gun task force has been engaged in Baltimore City, ridding the city with guns. If you look at the records from 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, there's been hundreds and hundreds of guns which he's personally taken off the street. And what we have here from 2014 through 2016 is a handful, maybe five, maybe six incidents out of all those hundreds and we consider those incidents not to be good conduct, not to be -- they are crimes, but the crimes would be a theft crime and not a robbery and/or an extortion type of crime.

As the Court knows that the RICO predicate that some of the predicates, there's many, but the ones charged here in this particular case would be the fraud which is the overtime fraud and either the Hobbs Act robbery extortion or the Hobbs Act robbery would be predicates of theft, it's not a predicate to the RICO in itself. His conduct which he's admitted to is of theft on these multiple occasions. The robbery itself is taking away the goods of another through force and/or threat of force. In all of these incidents and that's where the Brady comes in in this particular request, we believe that the evidence will show and the Government has evidence that the incidents involving Detective Hersl were lawful, probable cause arrests.

I'm not going to get to the point where you shouldn't go into his subjective whether he intended or not to intend to,
but on the face, every single one -- and we normally don't. You know, we don't go into the subject of intent of a police officer.

THE COURT: Not for Fourth Amendment issues. This is a little different.

MR. PURPURA: But setting that aside, that's not the thrust of the argument. But the probable cause, there was probable cause in all of these particular events, the five or six that may involve Mr. Hersl, that once a probable cause arrest is made as I believe the evidence will show, that the guns were seized, that narcotics were seized and that money was seized. That once these items are seized, they are still in the lawful custody of the police officer. And then at that point if the officer as in this particular case converts a portion of that money to his own personal use as in one case and perhaps $\$ 200$ or $\$ 150$, that is a theft. There's no question about it. It's a theft that has been charged a theft in multiple Baltimore City cases in the past history. It's a theft which should be tried in Baltimore City Circuit Court. It's a theft to which Mr. Hersl readily admits his bad conduct and what he's done in this these particular cases. And it's no different as the Government suggests -- there's no attenuation because it's not temporal, that if Mr. Hersl then turned the money into the evidence control and then took the money from evidence control, it would still be a robbery under
the Government's theory. That's not true, because it's not -it's not.

THE COURT: I don't think so, but --
MR. PURPURA: It's not the temporal issue, but it's no different then because once you have lawful custody, lawful custody of the money, your duty is to turn it all in. If you don't turn it all in, that's a theft of those proceeds. It's a theft of money which now belongs to Baltimore City as much as it still belongs to the person he seized it from.

THE COURT: Suppose, going back to intent for a moment, that there were proof that a jury could find it was part of the plan from the beginning that your client was going to go to a particular location with or without, but let's say with a valid search or arrest warrant, but part of the normal operating procedure was to take a portion of whatever was there even though he had no right to it?

MR. PURPURA: I hear the Court's argument.
Factually from what I've received in this case, that's not going to occur. I've reviewed both Gondo's testimony and Shropshire trial and I've reviewed Mr. Rayam's testimony and I didn't get that flavor whatsoever. That's why I'm making this Brady motion because $I$ believe what they will testify to unless -- I know the Government wouldn't couch them differently, but $I$ believe they would testify that they were committing lawful probable cause arrests. As a matter of
fact, Rayam when he testified in Shropshire and I have the testimony here, he testified that once he stopped someone for a good arrest, he probably gave him a break on the charging document and charged him with a lesser charge if he took some of their money. So I don't see that scenario.

Now, if that scenario existed for the record alone, I'm not going to agree with the Court because I believe the Red Analysis may come in that you can't go behind the subjective intent of a police officer if there's on its face, probable cause. But intellectually I understand what the Court is saying to me.

But what I'm saying to the Court for purposes of Brady in this case is it is a jury question. We could have a Court question too because as you know we can take a Court trial as well, but that we are -- if it's Brady -- if it's there and that's our theory, then give it to us, that's all. If they said that, give it to us. So we know in the clear and I'll just do this and I'll sit down -- that we know that there were robberies. And some of these gentlemen did commit real robberies where you know that in Shropshire in the testimony on page 147, this is when Rayam -- at first what Rayam intended to do -- this is with Gondo, they intended to go into the Anderson house to commit a burglary if you recall, because they didn't think anyone was home. That's a burglary, not even a robbery. So they went into the house and lo and
behold, what Rayam says, I pulled out my gun to startle her and I was trying to scare her. And I know I gave her some orders like, just don't move. And I could have even said, I'll kill ya and where is the money.

Now on its face we know that's a robbery. When they pled, he can plead to it, that's a robbery, a distinct robbery which they did and this is when they were not acting as police officers.

What I'm suggesting in my Brady motion that the Government has and I've tried -- I apologize.

THE COURT: No, go ahead.
MR. PURPURA: I've talked to -- some of the police officers I've been able to talk to. They really don't want to talk to me because they're afraid who knows what's been happening. They can still be charged even if they believe they didn't do things. I was able to at least in one conversation with Detective Clewl. Detective Clewl was on the -- I can say names now, can't I? The H case. What's their initials? July 8, 2015 Westminster incident, the one involving bringing the people back to Carroll County where the search occurred.

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. PURPURA: Detective Clewl from what I've learned from him would be that he thought it was a legitimate police operation. He thought the affidavit was valid. He's the one
that called in just off of vacation, Detective Hersl who came from vacation the day before, knew nothing about the investigation, called him in at that time to conduct surveillance and then the arrest of the Hamiltons and then it goes on.

So that's information $I$ was able to glean. The Government had that information well before $I$ was able to eventually talk to this particular detective.

So what I'm asking the Court is that you know what my theory of defense is. I think it's a viable theory of defense here. It's going to be a jury question in this particular case. Even at best if they intended in advance, whether there is intent or not intent, whether it's a legitimate probable cause. It is not going on the street and taking money from a citizen who is doing nothing at all wrong. Detective Hersl is not walking up to John Blow who is doing nothing at all wrong. On all these incidents, it's a person who's out there, dealing drugs, with a gun who is being arrested.

And subsequent to that, out of the hundreds there's a few bad ones which involve the theft of those proceeds before they made it to inventory.

THE COURT: So, the information that you're looking for would be Brady, if $I$ agree that you have a valid theory of defense.

MR. PURPURA: That's right. And something that's
going to go to the jury. If I generate a jury question, that's a valid theory --

THE COURT: But what is the jury question exactly?
MR. PURPURA: At worst case it would be, did the officers act originally with the intent to arrest the person to steal from him or did the officers have probable cause and their intent was to arrest the person and subsequent to that, subsequent to the arrest, the money was taken. That's the jury question.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PURPURA: Yes, that -- did I articulate it?
THE COURT: You did. I'm not sure that I agree with you, but $I$ believe $I$ understand your theory.

MR. PURPURA: All right, well --
THE COURT: It's -- we have a course of events. Whether or not they go in with an initially valid warrant, if they go in and use that valid warrant in a way to induce, wrongfully induce consent of people to turn over property which is not actually going to be given to the Baltimore Police evidence department, it's going to be taken for their own purposes. I'm not sure why that is not extortion.

MR. PURPURA: I like the sound of extortion more than robbery.

THE COURT: Okay, well it's called extortion.
MR. PURPURA: Right, but let me --

THE COURT: By wrongful use or threat of force, violence or fear.

MR. PURPURA: But here's why it's not. And what you have to -- and why $I$ believe $I$ can generate -- why it generates a question for the trier of fact, as I articulated when $I$ first started, there are hundreds of arrests involving Detective Hersl. Of those hundreds, there's just a handful. So if you tried to show intent that he's predisposed to do this, you would show a lot more than the very few $I$ believe in this limited, over these three years that the Government is going to present it.

So if there is, again, a probable cause -- a basis for the arrest, and here's the jury determination. Do you believe that Detective Hersl was arresting $S S$ or $H T$ because he intended to take money from him or do you believe that Detective Hersl was arresting $S S$ and/or HT because he had probable cause and was acting under authority and color of law at that time? And if so, when he takes the property, takes the property for purpose of bringing that property -- now he's not using force at that time because he has lawful authority to take that property -- every arrest of a police officer meets the definition of a robbery. But we give police officers the authority to use their force to stop a person and take the wrongful proceeds from that person. And so it really comes down to the criminal mens rea of the defendant and
that's why it's a generated jury question.
If these are fabricated probable cause which we have, it's been in the paper, there's a lot of things like that, then you don't -- you don't have that. You don't have it. We can go that step. But here if I generate and the evidence generates this, I'm entitled to it, that's why I'm entitled for a practical matter to the Brady information which I'm requesting.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
MR. PURPURA: Let me see if there's anything else that I wanted. That's it, thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else either defense counsel want to say on that point?

MR. LEVIN: No, thank you.
MS. WICKS: No, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Wise?

MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor. So Mr. Purpura said that any time a police officer seized property, that that could be charged as a robbery which of course is not the case because the --

THE COURT: Well, that's not really what he said. I mean --

MR. WISE: Well, I'm trying to understand this probable cause defense.

THE COURT: The theory as I understand it is that
he's saying essentially that you charged the wrong crime. That if the officer had probable cause to make the arrest and take the property and did so and it all would have been lawful had he only taken it down to the Baltimore Police Headquarters and put it in evidence control and done what he was supposed to, that then he would not have committed a crime. And what he $I$ believe is saying is that if the officer goes in there with probable cause, has the right to take the property from the person to begin with, the fact that he later steals some of it, doesn't turn it over to evidence control, does not amount to robbery or extortion.

MR. WISE: And I think that's really the difference. There is no "later" in these cases. The property -- the intent for the Maryland robbery statute is the intent at the time of the taking. And so in the case of $H T$ which is racketeering act 4 on November 27, 2015, then Detective Hersl detained this man, took $\$ 530$ from him, put part of it in his pocket and then turned $\$ 216$, put the other $\$ 216$ into an evidence envelope and sent it downtown.

So the intent at the time of the taking is what makes this a robbery. He didn't -- and this is the case $I$ think they want to defend, but they don't have. He didn't send $\$ 530$ down to the evidence control unit and then sneak in later that night and cut open the bag and take out everything but the $\$ 216$.

And it's the same fact pattern for racketeering act 5 which was the very next day when he stopped AS, took $\$ 500$ from him and only submitted $\$ 218$. And it's the same -- there is the same temporal issue in all five of the specific robbery episodes that are alleged against Mr. Hersl. The money at the time of the taking is put in Mr. Hersl's pocket, his vest, a bag. It is never submitted.

So is there probable cause to make an arrest to seize some portion? There may be, although there will be testimony by a number of these victims that they were not engaged in the conduct that Detective Hersl asserted they were in the statements of probable cause and he's even admitted in at least one of those instances that the statement of probable cause is a fabrication. But probable cause doesn't give him authority to put money in his pocket. It gives him authority to submit money to the evidence control unit to seize it on behalf of the police power vested in the state. And that's really why every seizure cannot be charged as a robbery. That was the inartful point $I$ was trying to make. Because at the time of the taking, the intent is to submit it. And in this case, on each occasion, he submitted some of it and he kept some of it. So even if there is valid probable cause, it's no defense to the portion that he took for himself at the same time.

THE COURT: And just asking the follow-up on
something you said that you mentioned a statement of probable cause. For these particular acts, number 4 and number 5, whatever they are, if there is a statement of probable cause warrant, whatever, that goes along with that event, has that been turned over?

MR. WISE: Anything we have like that we've turned over. If there's an incident report usually in each episode although not always -- they weren't great about their paperwork believe it or not -- the statement of probable cause. Warrants have been incredibly difficult to track down. The city courts are not easy places to navigate to find warrants. Where we have warrants we've turned them over. Candidly there's a lot of problems with these warrants that all of the co-defendants will testify about. So even the question of whether there is probable cause -- and I'm very reluctant to concede that that's something a trial jury should even be deciding. I mean, these are incredibly difficult. Whether probable cause exists is something we reserve to trial judges in pretrial settings precisely because these are nuanced and difficult questions of law.

And so we're not conceding that that's even an appropriate defense. He can certainly argue about what his state of mind was, but the idea that there was a complete defense to a robbery charge if there is probable cause we think is legally inaccurate. Because intent to rob can
certainly coexist with intent to seize some percentage of those funds for the state, for the sovereign pursuant to what he believes is his authority to do it because of probable cause or what he thinks he saw or what an informant told him, but, you know, none of that acts as a complete defense to these charges. None of them magically turns them into thefts. And I'm sort of astonished to hear that the defense is going to say that these are thefts, but not robberies. As Your Honor pointed out they are then -- I don't know how that's a defense to their extortions, either violent extortions or extortions under color of official right at the very least, but $I$ guess we'll have to wait and see.

THE COURT: Yup.
MR. PURPURA: Last word, if I may?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. PURPURA: Thanks. The issue of probable cause in any civil case involving a police officer is decided by the jury itself. Whether the police officer was acting with the proper authority and probable cause is a jury question. And the jury is instructed on that and they make that determination. In this particular case, and --

THE COURT: I don't necessarily agree with you, but that's fine.

MR. PURPURA: In this particular case I think we are both equally astounded at each other. What $I$ see here is a
generated -- if the facts come out the way I'm suggesting, a generated jury question. The Government is arguing it's either some sort of robbery, some sort of extortion, extortion A or extortion B. The way $I$ believe the facts will show in this particular case is that Detective Hersl was acting appropriately when he committed a really -- when he arrested someone, that he had probable cause to make that arrest, that he has the authority at that point -- and this is a question of intent -- he has the authority at that point to seize the drugs, the guns and the money. And then after when he has lawful at that point still because they're all connected together and that's what happens, and then they go down to the inventory. If he decides at that point that I'm only going to turn in 50 of the 300 , then that is a theft, a conversion of what should be at that point seized money, lawfully seized. And that $I$ believe is the question the jury must make in this particular case.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I am going to defer on that one, the Brady along with the duplicitous one.

There is your next one, number 225 , the motion in limine to preclude the Government and its witnesses to referring to alleged acts as robberies. And by that you mean they can't say that they thought they were committing a robbery?

MR. PURPURA: Yeah. Let's take a look at it for a second. And in my motion I think it was Mr. Wise that had,
you know, I think it was Rayam on the witness stand and used the word "robbery" "robbery" "robbery" "robbery" 15 times when going through the acts. Some of the acts as I pointed out and showed on the overhead are clear robberies that these gentlemen committed. And some as I'm suggesting would be conversions/thefts of monies that were properly seized at that point and not robberies. And here's the simple point. The 607 allows either party to impeach credibility. The only reason that the Government would put Gondo and Rayam up there and ask them about their prior bad acts under 608 and/or 609 normally is to kind of blunt the sting of cross-examination because then we get into it, didn't you do this -- well that's not the case here in this particular case. That's not what cross is all about in this particular case. But what they're able to do -- so it has a limited purpose normally. And so what they're able to do by classifying everything as a robbery, robbery, robbery is to take away from the province of the jury, the legal conclusion. Because in this particular case whether there is a robbery or not a robbery as in the theft, that's a conclusion that the jury is going to draw. If you look at the plea agreements of all the defendants that have pled so far, the elements are spelled out and the elements that are spelled out are for the RICO statute, not for the robbery portion, just RICO itself, what it takes to commit a RICO, not the force and threat of force. The only
reference to robbery is in the calculation of the guidelines. And there's a lot of reasons why people will agree to a plea agreement other than the fact that they agree that their acts constitute a robbery. And that would be lo and behold what happened here. If you don't plead now, the Government is going to file a 924(c). One 924(c) against you or two $924(\mathrm{c}) \mathrm{s}$ against you. So your delay if you would have pled to robberies even though intelligently you can't come to grips or legally you can't come to grips with the fact that it's a robbery, you're now stuck with one or now two 924 (c)s.

So I'm just not asking the Government to -- they can talk about the acts. I did this, I did that, but the conclusion that their particular act was a robbery in this particular case under this fact situation is a legal conclusion for the jury to draw and not for the defendants to draw. We inarticulately use "robbery" often on the street. If there's a burglary in the house, we call it a robbery. If there's a housebreaking, we call it a robbery. If somebody takes something from you we call it a robbery. And everything has a different category or different things or different elements. If they didn't, we wouldn't be here. We wouldn't be going to trial because we haven't denied what we've done. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, anybody want to add anything?
MR. LEVIN: No thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Government?

MR. WISE: Your Honor, Mr. Purpura says what we characterize as robberies. Five criminal defendants have stood up in front of Your Honor, one sergeant, four former detectives and admitted they committed robberies. They have had competent counsel. They have lengthy statements of facts where they make admissions concerning their conduct. It's not simply as Mr. Purpura says in the calculation of guidelines. They admit they use force. They admit they restrained people. What they -- when they talk about -- when Detective Rayam, former Detective Rayam testified, he used the word "robberies" because that's what in his mind he did. It's not us characterizing it.

And so the ultimate issue for the jury is, is that what Mr. Hersl did? The question of what Mr. Rayam and Mr. Gondo and Mr. Hendrix and Mr. Taylor -- and Mr. Ward did are settled. And so the idea that they can't -- we have to construct some, you know, magic words for them to describe what they did, $I$ think is frankly sort of preposterous. And the Court routinely presides over trials where co-defendants will testify and they will describe what they did. They're charged with possession with intent to distribute or conspiracy to distribute and they tell the jury, that's what I did and here's how $I$ did it and they use the language in the statute. And then again the question is, is the defendant on trial guilty of that offense? And the Court instructs the
jury that they have to make individualized findings of guilt and we proceed.

I've never seen a trial where we couldn't use the words that the defendants -- that the co-defendants would use to describe their conduct that they were charged with or that they pled to and I think it would be extraordinarily unnecessary.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. WICKS: Your Honor, just to correct the record I think Mr. Wise -- I've said the wrong name before apparently and he just said Taylor when --

MR. WISE: I said Ward. I said Ward. I corrected myself.

THE COURT: He did, yeah. Thank you, to be clear.
MR. PURPURA: Last word, Judge. I don't have to tell you, you know that the threat of a $924(\mathrm{c})$, we know what that does. We know how that can induce pleas. Look, I'm not going to go to school and tell you what the other lawyers have told me people have come in here and bit their tongue when they talked about robberies when they know factually what they really are, but they were not therefore charged with a $924(\mathrm{c})$ and two $924(c) s$ gives you at least 30 years and then the robberies on top of that. So everyone knows what it is.

But be that as it may, in this particular case, it's different than just about any other case that we've tried
because the essence of this case is whether the actions of Detective Hersl which may have coincided with Rayam and Gondo are a robbery, a robbery as for the jury to make that determination, not for them. And we're not asking not to use those acts. You can use those acts, just say did you do such and such, you take money? Is money missing? Tell us your participation. That's it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, well I'm not going to impose a blanket prohibition on referring to these things as robberies. Some of them probably were. And in any event, there are defendants who believe that that's what they pled guilty to.

On the other hand, $I$ certainly think that $I$ can ask the Government to be restrained and careful about that and not use that word unnecessarily and I will approach it in the way that we customarily do when there's a person that is a co-defendant that has been charged in the conspiracy and is admitting to guilt of the same thing that other people are charged with is to provide a limiting instruction and make it clear that whatever somebody else pled to is not dispositive for the people that are on trial and the jury has to make an individual determination as to them.

So I'm denying, but with a caution. The motion in limine to preclude the reference to these prior acts as robberies.
I think that is it except for the most recently
filed motion relating to the trial date which I would like to discuss with counsel in chambers. Is there any other open motion?

MR. WISE: There isn't a motion, Your Honor, I just wanted to briefly put on the record: I had a conversation with defense counsel on two issues that $I$ think we've resolved, I just --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WISE: -- I just thought would be important to make sure. I think we will likely file a motion in limine asking the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the Baltimore Police Department is a legal entity and from other cases where legal entities have been charged, that's the mechanism that is the preferred route. So I've mentioned that to defense counsel. I would just mention that that's -- I don't know that everyone consented, but no one told me we'll object, you have to call some witness to say the Baltimore Police Department is a legal entity, so we anticipate doing that.

On a related issue, the overtime -- the evidence of overtime fraud in this case will be for several different kinds. There will be things like travel records that show people being out of the state or even out of the country at certain times when they were claiming overtime. There will be testimony obviously from co-defendants. There will also be
though information through a law enforcement witness, most likely Special Agent Jensen, where she compared the overtime records to the location of the defendants based on their cell phone. And it's our view that that's not -- that what she did is not expert analysis. It didn't involve any special tools like in a bank robbery where precise location is critical. It was simply comparing the location of the defendant's phone, let's say on a morning it's sitting at a tower near their house in Middle River and meanwhile the overtime slip says they've been working downtown since 8:30 or something. We raised that issue with defense to say we don't think this is expert testimony. We frankly could get an expert and have someone qualified that way, but we think it's actually -- that that comparison exercise is something a law enforcement officer would do.

We could file a motion in limine to that end, but $I$ think from what I've heard from defense counsel, we're in agreement that we need not tender an expert for that kind of testimony. And I just wanted to put that, sort of put that out there. And I think that's it from us at this time.

MR. PURPURA: Your Honor, just --
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. PURPURA: I may not object to that, but I'm letting the Government know that $I$ may argue that in close or another time even in cross-examining whoever they put on the
stand that they're not an expert and they really don't know these things and maybe should know these things and may go into a panoply of issues involving cell towers.

MR. WISE: I mean, sure. What we can do then is we can notice an expert and we can either call that person in rebuttal if that's the kind of -- if that's the kind of cross that is -- that's conducted with the agent who compared the location of the cell phone to the overtime records that were sulomitted.

THE COURT: Okay. I see Mr. Purpura nodding, that would be fine.

MR. WISE: Okay, we'll do that. Thank you.
MS. WICKS: Your Honor, I just -- I don't think the Court had made a decision and I'm just otherwise submitting on the record as to 211 and 212.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm sorry, yes.
MS. WICKS: I think we just skipped -- I mean, not that there's a problem, but we skipped some things.

THE COURT: We did skip a few things. You're submitting?

MS. WICKS: I'm submitting on 211 and 212.
THE COURT: 211 which I'm denying and 212 being excluding hearsay from alleged co-conspirators which I'm also denying. Of course, subject to what the jury will be instructed, there are certain things that the Government will
have to show that statements were made in the course of the conspiracy and furtherance of the conspiracy and so forth, but I'm not excluding it in advance. That's 211 and 212.

MS. WICKS: Then 209 I'm also submitting. I think -- I'll have further discussions with the Government, but the transcripts that I've gotten so far, there's definitely -- I think it depends on -- clearly there's a huge volume of transcripts and information, so if they let me know, if we get to that point what ones, there definitely will be transcripts that $I$ believe the defense takes issue with.

THE COURT: All right, you'll continue to discuss that. I'm not going to rule on that one then. That's number 209. Okay, anything else?

MR. PURPURA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you all. See you upstairs in chambers in a few minutes.

THE CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court is now adjourned.
(Proceeding concluded.)

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Dated this 4 th day of January, 2018.

Nadine IM. Gazic, RMR, CRR
NADINE M. GAZIC RMR, GR

FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER


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